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Symposium on Diversity
Social Security Reform: Creating
Transformative Opportunities
for African Americans
The Social Security retirement income
program provides important security
to nearly all workers in the U.S. How-
ever, choices made at the program's
creation exclude many African
Americans, especially women, from
coverage. Professor Williams reviews
aspects of the Social Security system
and proposes reforms in order to
provide equitable protection.
This article is based on the author's
presentation at the Annual Meeting of
the Elder Law Section of the
Association of American Law Schools
in January, 2001 in San Francisco.
By Phoebe Weaver Williams
Reforming Social Security has been thesubject of considerable public discus-sion. Considered the "third rail" ofAmerican politics, in the past, politi-cians assumed that "to so much as
even touch [Social Security was] to risk instant po-
litical death."1 From 1950 to 1972, Congress
approved amendments expanding the scope of the
Social Security Act by overwhelming margins, with
no President vetoing a Social Security bill.2 Social
Security has now lost the virtual immunity it once
enjoyed from political critique. Reforming Social
Security has emerged as a national priority, as critics
voice concerns about its future financial stability and
assault its efficacy. Supporters emphasize its suc-
cesses, while some question the motives of the critics,
characterizing their concerns as ideological animus
rather than real concerns about the viability of So-
cial Security.3 Despite the flurry of controversy
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surrounding Social Security, one aspect of the dis-
course is relatively underdeveloped.
This essay considers the public discussion surround-
ing reforming Social Security from the historical, social,
and economic perspectives of African Americans. It
focuses on three areas where Social Security has per-
petuated societal racial discrimination against African
Americans. First, racial inequity surfaced when Con-
gress decided to exclude certain occupations as covered
employment under Social Security. During 1950, Con-
gress addressed this inequity, extending coverage to
agricultural and domestic workers. However, the en-
forcement of the reporting requirements for people
working in those occupations has been relatively lax,
effectively negating the coverage of those occupations.
Second, Social Security benefit amounts were based
on reported earnings in employment. To the extent
that racial discrimination occurred in employment mar-
kets, Congress incorporated the effects of that
discrimination against African Americans into the very
program designed to ameliorate the economic devas-
tation caused by old age, disability, or early death of
the wage earner. Finally recent reports of bias in the
adjudication of claims for disability benefits suggest
that racial bias may disadvantage African Americans
in the administration of the Social Security program.
Undoubtedly, there are other areas where Social Secu-
rity has disadvantaged African Americans. However,
the purpose here is not to identify all of them, but rather
to broaden the parameters of current reform discus-
sions. Further, while the focus here will be on the impact
of Social Security for African Americans, I acknowl-
edge that in many instances the concerns raised apply
to other historically disadvantaged groups as well.
To date, Social Security reform discussions have
focused to a relatively limited extent on the advantages
and disadvantages of various reform proposals for
African Americans. 4 Review of this discourse finds it
lacking in a number of respects. Often discussions
about Social Security reform neither accurately assess
nor completely identify the structural inequities' that
exist within the policy, administration, and adjudica-
tion of the Social Security program entitlements. As a
result, current reform recommendations have not ad-
dressed longstanding inequities within Social Security
policy and administration.
Proponents of certain reform measures have at-
tempted to bolster the acceptability of their proposals
by asserting that they are in the best interests of Af-
rican Americans. After years of relative neglect,
attention to the interests of African Americans could
be viewed very positively. However, closer review
of their arguments reveals that they are more likely
framed to create political coalitions that include Af-
rican Americans as supporters of their proposals. 6
Social Security reform discourse tends to revolve
around two opposing positions-privatization and
anti-privatization proposals. 7 Proponents of
privatization argue that the better way to ensure that
there are adequate resources available to support
future generations during retirement is to encourage
personal savings. If portions of the Social Security
taxes are returned to wage earners and placed in in-
dividual retirement accounts-privatizing aspects of
Social Security-African Americans will enjoy much
better returns on their investments. Privatization
proponents want to "fix" Social Security by chan-
neling some of the tax payments to the private
investment markets, thereby converting Social Secu-
rity in part from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution type of pension program.'
Opponents of privatization argue that continu-
ing the guaranteed defined benefit structure under
Social Security provides the best protection for Afri-
can Americans? Advocates of this position want to
"save" Social Security, retaining both its benefit and
financing structures. In the words of one of the most
vocal proponents of this position, Reverend Jesse
Jackson, those opposed to privatization want to see
the program saved, "not savaged, not sutured, not
severed, not sliced up, but saved." 10
When critiqued in light of the history of Social
Security, neither position unmasks the inequities
within Social Security that disadvantage African
Americans. Neither position fully identifies or ex-
poses structural inequities in Social Security.
Consequently, neither position articulates reform
measures that address the interests of African Ameri-
cans. If Social Security reform is to benefit African
Americans, Congress should address certain inequi-
ties in the policy and administration of the Social
Security program. Otherwise, the historical disad-
vantages along with the political compromises that
have sacrificed the interests of African Americans in
the past will continue.
Social Security Law: Perpetuating Societal
Racial Discrimination
An Act with Its Genesis in Discrimination
Social Security was one of President Franklin
Roosevelt's emergency initiatives designed to relieve
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the "human distress" caused by the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. During the Depression, one-fourth
of the nation's workforce was unemployed and one-
fifth subsisted on direct relief or work relief.1 While
"every major European country had already em-
braced the logic of social insurance," it took the Great
Depression to launch this idea in the United States. 12
Middle-class ideals of self-reliance and prudence
conflicted with the idea that the government should
act to combat the "'three fears' that plagued work-
ers-unemployment, poverty in old age, and ill
health."13 However, the Depression convinced even
many of the working elite that "economic misfor-
tune was not always the consequence of individual
irresponsibility or failure of character." 14
Roosevelt's New Deal measures had several goals:
"recovery, relief, and reconstruction." i" Roosevelt
believed that the government must not only meet the
immediate needs of those suffering the effects of the
Depression. It must also develop a "long-range pro-
gram to protect the American people from the ill
effects of unemployment and other personal eco-
nomic hazards. ' 16 Just 14 months after Roosevelt
expressed a general interest in developing a social
insurance program, Congress passed the Social Se-
curity Act of 1935.17
The Social Security Act of 1935 contained eleven
titles.18 Several are relevant to the discussion here,
the purpose of which is not only to generally de-
scribe the history and concept of "Social Security,"
but also to demonstrate how purposeful, intentional
racial bias and discrimination influenced the struc-
ture of the program at its inception. 9 Title I provided
grants to the states to pay half the cost of old-age
assistance programs.20 Congress imposed only "gen-
eral conditions" on the states for eligibility for the
federal funds-how payments were to be made to
the states and how the program was to be adminis-
tered.21 Southern members of Congress resisted
federal regulation fearing that significant federal
oversight might represent the "entering wedge" for
interfering with the "Negro question" in the south.22
Threatening opposition, they even insisted on remov-
ing a provision in the House bill that would have
required the states provide sufficient assistance "com-
patible with decency and health." 23 Edwin Witte,
the Executive Director of the committee responsible
for drafting the policies that would frame the legis-
lation, concluded that "[t]he southern members did
not want to give authority to anyone in Washington
to deny aid to any state because it discriminated
against Negroes in the administration of old age as-
sistance." 24 During a hearing before the House,
Representative Howard Smith of Virginia quoted
from a newspaper editorial that expressed the senti-
ments of white southerners towards providing aid
to African Americans, "The average Mississippian
can't imagine himself chipping in to pay pensions
for able-bodied negroes to sit around in idleness on
front galleries, supporting all their kinfolks on pen-
sions, while cotton and corn crops are crying for
workers to get them out of the grass." 2
Title II of the Act originally only provided for
old age benefits for retired workers at age 65. Sev-
eral amendments extended and enlarged the
categories of persons entitled to benefits. 26 Subse-
quently, all of the programs under Title II were
referred to as "Social Security," although they were
technically named federal Old Age, Survivors, Dis-
ability, and Hospital Insurance (OASDHI).27 Title II
programs were entirely administered by the federal
government. Structured as contributory insurance
programs, only workers who paid taxes under the
Federal Insurance Contribution Act (Title VII), and
later certain of their dependents, were entitled to
benefits. Remarks made by the chairman of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee convey the social and political
sentiments towards structuring Title II of the Social
Security Act as a contributory program. Old age
insurance, he explained "comports better than any
substitute we have discovered with the American
concept that free men want to earn their security
and not ask for doles-that what is due as a matter
of earned right is far better than a gratuity.... So-
cial Security is not a handout; it is not a charity; it is
not relief." 28 The "poor" aged, disabled, and their
dependents along with surviving widows and chil-
dren were excluded from Title II to avoid the stigma
of it being considered "welfare. 29
However, all working Americans would not have
an equal opportunity to avail themselves of this right
to earn their "security against the hazards and vicis-
situdes of life." 30 When enacted in 1935, Title II
covered only a "bare majority of the labor force,
essentially all employees in the nonfarm private sec-
tor other than railroad employees who were covered
under their own plan."3" Congress omitted two oc-
cupational groups from coverage, agricultural and
domestic workers, and, as a result, excluded from
3.5 million to 5.5 million African American work-
ers. 32 Members of Congress were well aware of
the adverse effects of their decisions on African
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Americans. There was testimony before the House
Committee on Labor that "practically eighty-five
percent of the Negroes in the South are agricultural
workers." 3
African American women suffered an even
greater disadvantage. Between 1930 and 1940, "nine
out of ten black women workers toiled as agricul-
tural laborers or domestic servants." 4 During the
1940s, women of European descent became clerical
workers, working in employment covered by Social
Security. By 1940, "one-third of all white, but only
1.3 % of all black, working women had clerical jobs.
On the other hand, sixty percent of black female
workers were domestic servants; the figure for white
women was only ten percent."' 5 By 1944, black
women still occupied sixty percent of the domestic
service jobs.' 6 African American women were not
necessarily overrepresented as domestic workers,
because they lacked the training and education to
pursue other occupational fields.' 7 Highly educated
African American women were excluded from many
occupations open to European American women.
38
If unable to secure jobs as teachers in the southern
segregated school system, highly educated African
American women more likely worked in domestic
rather than clerical occupations.' 9
Just as Congress excluded agricultural and do-
mestic workers from coverage under Social Security,
Congress also excluded these two occupation groups
from the protections of other recovery legislation:
the National Industrial Recovery Act (1935) and the
Fair Labor Standards Act 193 8.40 Consequently, only
ten percent of gainfully employed African American
women derived any direct benefits from federal poli-
cies designed to address the plight of workers after
the Depression. 41
The Social Security bill in its original form in-
cluded coverage for agricultural and domestic
workers. However, as Attorney Charles Hamilton
Houston when representing the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People would
aptly observe, southern congressmen were unlikely
to vote for the bill "if Negroes are to benefit from it
in any large measure." 42 By failing to provide cover-
age for agricultural and domestic occupations in a
society that racially stratified occupational opportu-
nities for African Americans, Congress embraced the
discriminatory structure that limited African Ameri-
cans' work opportunities, and likewise offered
limited opportunities for African Americans to en-
joy the "security" offered by the 1935 Act.
The Act was eventually amended in 1950 with
Congress granting coverage to people working in
agricultural and domestic occupations. 43 However,
there was relatively lax enforcement of reporting
requirements for these occupational groups. 44 Only
recently, through highly publicized embarrassing
accounts of reporting violations by political nomi-
nees to high profile public positions, has this problem
received public attention. 41
Title III of the Social Security Act of 1935 pro-
vided grants to states for unemployment compen- sation
administration. There was considerable controversy
over the "jurisdictional location ' 46 of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance program. However, just as desires for
autonomy to engage in racial discrimination assumed
prominence for decisions about other Titles of the Act,
"race relations and business control over the labor
markets prevailed" when deciding this controversy. As
a result, unemployment compensation insurance was
administered at state and local levels so that the "pro-
grams failed to reach those most in need-employees
of small firms, agricultural workers, women, African
Americans, [and] migrants." 47
Social Security: An Act that has Perpetuated
Societal Racial Discrimination Against African
Americans
The Social Security Administration (SSA) follows
three major steps when computing an individual's
primary insurance amount (PIA). 48 SSA uses the PIA
figure to determine almost all cash benefit amounts
for workers, their dependents, and their survivors.49
When calculating the PIA, SSA initially determines
the individual's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME). ° The AIME represents an adjustment cal-
culation designed to reduce the disparity between
the benefit amounts payable only on the basis of re-
cent earnings (for example to a younger disabled
worker) and the benefit amounts payable to older
individuals s.5 The averaged earnings of older work-
ers include the lower amounts that were subject to
Social Security taxes during the earlier years of So-
cial Security coverage.5 2 SSA then determines the
appropriate benefit formula to use for the worker.53
SSA benefit formulas will generally require the se-
lection of a specified number of years that represent
the insured worker's highest reported earnings (thirty-
five years for most retiring workers, fewer years for
disabled or younger deceased workers)., 4 Through
the use of a progressive formula, one that considers
increasingly lower percentages of the AIME as the
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amount increases, the SSA calculates the PIA.55 The
PIA is then used to determine the worker's and any
eligible beneficiary's benefit amount.56 A relatively
simple concept can be derived from the extraordi-
narily complex calculation processes used by
SSA-Social Security benefits are tied to individual
earnings reported on the records of the Social Secu-
rity Administration.
The Social Security benefit formula results in
persons with relatively low average earnings receiv-
ing benefit amounts that replace a higher relative
fraction of their pre-entitlement earnings.5 7 How-
ever, policy makers acknowledge that this feature has
not made up for the effects of discrimination and
other barriers that have depressed the earnings of
minority group members."8 As a result, the calcula-
tion of Social Security benefits perpetuates racial
discrimination experienced by African Americans
during their working years throughout their retire-
ment or disability.59 The same problem occurs if
dependents receive benefits on the account of an
African American wage earner, since their benefit
amounts are based upon the wage earner's primary
insurance amount (PIA).
During 1979, an advisory council to the House
Ways and Means Committee noted the "deplorable"
consequences of racial discrimination and recom-
mended that changes to Social Security should be
assessed for their impact on persons from racial and
ethnic minority backgrounds. 60 Nevertheless, the ad-
visory council concluded, "it would be neither
appropriate nor desirable to try to use Social Security
as a device for dealing with these problems." 61 The
advisory council reasoned that "the ultimate remedies
for such discrimination will come through the Con-
gress, the courts, the schools, the job market, and the
political forum. 62 However, this reasoning missed the
point. It may have been too much to expect the Social
Security program to address discrimination in markets
for employment. However, it was not too much to
expect Congress to address the perpetuation of that
discrimination against African American families faced
with the "economic hazards" of old age, disability, or
death of a wage earner.
Congress was experienced and knew how to ad-
just Social Security benefits to address the economic
disadvantages of societal employment discrimination.
Under the 1935 Title II legislation, women were not
afforded any special treatment-wages of employ-
ees were taxed at the same rate, and the formula for
calculating benefits was gender neutral. 63 However,
shortly after enactment, Congress expanded the ben-
efit categories to provide for gender specific benefits:
wife's, widow's, mother's, and eventually divorced
wife's benefits. 64 Men would not be entitled to simi-
lar spousal benefits until later amendments to the
Act.65 However, to qualify for these benefits, they
had to prove financial dependency on their wives'
earnings. 66 Further, Congress recognized that women
experienced "severe job discrimination during eco-
nomic downturns and tense labor disputes." 67 In
response to this discrimination, during 1956, Con-
gress enacted elaborate actuarial adjustments to the
calculations of women's Social Security benefits.
These remained in effect until 1972.6 Eventually,
the gender specific spousal benefit categories fell to
constitutional challenges, with courts finding that
such distinctions violated equal protection rights
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 69
However, when confronted with a challenge to the
actuarial adjustments that advantaged women, the
Supreme Court rejected arguments that the sex dif-
ferential calculations violated Fifth Amendment equal
protection guarantees. The Court agreed that Con-
gress had the right to remedy longstanding
employment discrimination against women through
adjustment of Social Security benefit calculations.70
It reasoned that reducing the disparity in the eco-
nomic conditions between men and women caused
by a long history of discrimination against women
was an important governmental objective. 71 "Allow-
ing women, who as such have been unfairly hindered
from earning as much as men, to eliminate additional
low-earning years from the calculation of their re-
tirement benefits work[ed] directly to remedy some
part of the effect of past discrimination." 72
Thus, a pattern emerged, with public officials
responding to the discrimination faced by women,
but basically ignoring the employment discrimina-
tion faced by African Americans and other
historically disadvantaged groups.73 When Congress
addressed employment discrimination against
women, it did not have women of color in mind as
the primary beneficiaries. Considerably more respon-
sive to charges of sexism against women than to
charges of racism against African Americans, public
officials convened a series of "blue ribbon panels"
to discuss ways to eliminate discrimination against
women.74 Both groups have demanded redress of
inequities in the policies and administration of Title
II. Gender-specific benefits and adjustments to
the calculations of benefits amounts, at least to a
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limited extent, addressed societal discrimination that
disadvantaged women. However, inequities and so-
cial practices that disadvantaged African Americans
have received relatively "scant attention." 7  Re-
sponding to proposals that Congress adopt
amendments to explicitly offset the effects of past
racial and ethnic discrimination, the 1979 Advisory
Council on Social Security concluded that such ini-
tiatives would "move the program too far away from
its basic function of providing wage-related protec-
tion against long-term earnings loss." 76 The council
was content to rely upon legislation enacted thirty
years after the 1935 Social Security Act, Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to eventually ameliorate
the effects of race and ethnic discrimination on So-
cial Security benefits. 77
Critiquing the Discourse that Surrounds
Social Security Reform
Proponents of Privatization
In an essay addressing the implications of priva-
tization for African Americans, Alvin Williams
summarizes the major privatization reform posi-
tions. 78 He sets forth both the financial and moral
justifications for allowing individuals the opportu-
nity to place a portion of their Social Security taxes
in private accounts and direct those funds to invest-
ment in the equity markets or other investment
vehicles. 79 Citing studies by conservative institutions,
proponents of privatization argue that Social Secu-
rity is a poor investment that, at best, provides dismal
returns of 6.3 percent per year if not actual "losses"
for African Americans.8 ° Under their calculations
and analysis, African American workers will never
recover the amounts paid in taxes under the Social
Security program.81 African Americans have lower
earnings, and African American males in particular
have lower college attendance rates and longer work
histories, coupled with shorter life spans.8 2 There-
fore, Social Security represents an especially poor
financial investment for this group of workers. To
illustrate their point, privatization proponents offer,
as an example, the situation of a single African
American male in his twenties during 1996. They
project that such individuals enjoy returns of only
$.88 for each $1.00 paid in Social Security taxes. A
comparable African American female would only
earn a 1.2 percent return on the Social Security taxes
she will have paid.8 3
However, a critique that focuses solely on the
returns on taxes invested ignores other systemic is-
sues that confront African Americans. The same
discriminatory effects of racial discrimination in
employment markets that depress the Social Secu-
rity earnings of African Americans will persist under
privatization proposals. If privatization proponents
desire to correct inequities in Social Security that
disadvantage African Americans, their proposals
should also address the historic disadvantage expe-
rienced by African Americans whose earnings have
been depressed because of racial discrimination. I
acknowledge that it is unlikely that Congress would
support race-specific remedial measures similar to
the gender specific measures used for almost two de-
cades (from 1956 to 1972) to address discrimination
against women.84 However, there are neutral mea-
sures that could ameliorate the adverse effects of past
and present racial discrimination."
Steps could be taken to encourage actual victims
of discrimination or dependents of deceased victims
to come forward and seek adjustments of the records
of their earnings credited under Social Security. So-
cial Security has special reporting procedures for
properly crediting the earnings records of persons
awarded back pay as the result of findings by a court
or agency of discrimination, or court or agency ap-
proved settlements of discrimination claims (back pay
awarded under a statute).86 The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), for purposes of determining the taxa-
tion of back-pay awards, treats all the back pay as
wages in the year that the award is paid.87 In con-
trast, the SSA will credit a back-pay award as wages
in the year(s) that the wages should have been paid
if the award was made under a statute.88 To ensure
proper credit, the SSA requires that either the em-
ployee or the employer notify SSA. SSA has
acknowledged the importance of properly reporting
back-pay awards, "because wages not credited to
the proper year may result in lower Social Security
benefits or failure to meet the requirement for ben-
efits." 89 Nevertheless, SSA acknowledges that the
"law does not require that employers notify the SSA
of the different period(s) involved in a back pay un-
der statute case." 90 Here is where the problem
surfaces, since it will be up to the individual to en-
sure that her earnings record represents a correct
statement of her wages for Social Security purposes.
Evolving and unresolved issues surround the sub-
ject of taxation of employment discrimination
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recoveries. It is highly unlikely that individuals will
be made aware of their right to correct the records
of their earnings and, more importantly, appreciate
the impact on their future retirement, disability, or
survivors' income if they fail to do so.
During the past decade, the courts and the IRS
have grappled with complex issues concerning the
taxation of employment discrimination awards.9 1
The IRS has clarified some of the issues surrounding
the taxation of recoveries under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Nevertheless, issues such as what
aspects of the recovery are back pay or wages for
withholding purposes, continue to pose complex
questions.9 2 These difficult questions remain unre-
solved for even the most experienced practitioners. 3
Notably absent from discussions about taxation of
employment discrimination recoveries is the recog-
nition that proper allocations of back-pay earnings
on an individual's Social Security earnings record is
also an important concern. Thus, it is likely that, in
the vast majority of settled or even judicially adjudi-
cated cases, employees are unaware of their
opportunities to correct their records of earnings
under Social Security. There are likely numerous
instances where African Americans, or their depen-
dents or survivors, have probably received lower
Social Security benefits due to unreported or incor-
rectly allocated back-pay earnings on Social Security
records.
Opposing Privatization
Opponents of privatization represent another group
whose members figure prominently in Social Secu-
rity reform discussions. They assert that privatization
reformers do not want to save Social Security. They
really desire to dismantle one of the most important
social insurance programs developed in the history
of this country. The New Century Alliance for So-
cial Security, a coalition of organizations representing
the interests of organized labor, women, disabled
individuals, African Americans, Latin Americans, and
elderly and young Americans, has provided a forum
for articulating these viewpoints. 94 The "save Social
Security" proponents emphasize how it provides
working people with a secure base for retirement,
providing a lifetime of payments protected against
inflation.95 Emphasizing strong adequacy values 96
underlying Social Security, they focus on the pro-
gressive nature of Social Security that allows
low-income earners to recover the highest percent-
age of their earnings, while ignoring its regressive tax
structure.9 7 They view Social Security as a vitally im-
portant safety net for elderly African Americans; an
extremely effective means of keeping low-income and
working-class elderly out of poverty.
Some of their discussions acknowledge certain
racially structural inequities in Social Security. Both
the Urban League and the NAACP have pointed out
the racial inequities that stem from reforms that
raised the retirement age for collecting unreduced
Social Security retirement benefits to age sixty-seven.
Because of shorter life spans, African Americans may
collect ever fewer retirement benefits.98 However,
for the most part, the "save Social Security" propo-
nents uncritically accept and ignore many other
aspects of Social Security that disadvantage African
Americans. On occasion, their arguments may de-
flect critical scrutiny of Social Security to larger issues,
finding ways to raise the life expectancies of African
Americans, for example.9 9 However, focusing atten-
tion on improving life expectancy rates and infant
mortality rates for African Americans, so that they
are beyond those of persons living in third-world
countries, does not require ignoring racial inequities
within Social Security.
Stressing the importance of Social Security to
African American women in particular, "save Social
Security" proponents argue that "Social Security has
been a guarantee for a decent life for African Ameri-
can women. Social Security is the main source of
retirement income for many African American
women, since fifty percent do not have personal re-
tirement savings of any size. Thirty percent do not
have workplace pensions and benefits."10 However,
the very fact that Social Security has been so impor-
tant to members of the African American community
should encourage, not discourage, critical examina-
tion to ensure, for example, fairness in the processing
of claims for benefits.
For some individuals, establishing entitlement to
Social Security benefits can be a complex and diffi-
cult process. For example, applicants for disability
insurance benefits proceed through a five-step se-
quential evaluation process, until a determination of
disability or no disability is reached.' 0 ' At the first
step, Social Security field office personnel determine
if the applicant meets the programs' nonmedical eli-
gibility requirements-sufficient work to be
considered insured for disability insurance bene-
fits. 0 2 During steps two through five, state disability
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determination services (DDS) determine whether the
individual's impairment is sufficiently disabling to
qualify for benefits.103 Individuals who are denied
benefits may appeal to various levels for further re-
view: first to the DDS for reconsideration; second
for a hearing before one of approximately 850 So-
cial Security administrative law judges (ALJ); third
to the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals; and finally
to the federal courts.
The difficulty of establishing entitlement to dis-
ability benefits is exacerbated if key decision makers
bring racial prejudices to their decision-making pro-
cess. Yet, a study of the adjudication of appeals of
denial of claims for disability benefits suggests that
racial biases influence the appeals process. SSA had
observed disparities occurring "over the past thirty
years under the Social Security Disability Insurance
program (DI)" where "blacks have consistently been
allowed benefits at lower rates than whites, with the
magnitude of the difference ranging from between
four and thirteen percentage points." Prompted by
these and other disparities, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) examined the 1988 disability deter-
minations for evidence of racial discrimination. 10 4
The GAO found that at the initial decision level, the
disparities in allowance rates were explained by non-
racial factors: differences in the severity of
impairments and age.105 The exception to this find-
ing was the racial differences for young (under age
twenty-five) Supplemental Security Income appli-
cants. Differences in the allowance rates for this
group was "relatively large" and was not explained
for the most part by demographic factors such as
impairment severity and type. However, the largest
racial differences occurred at the appeals level where
ALJs conduct in-person hearings. At this level, the
demographic factors did not explain the racial dif-
ferences. 10 6 Further, the difference in ALJ allowance
rates was not related to racial differences in the ap-
peal rates or attorney representation at the
hearings. 10 7 The allowance rates for ALJs were forty-
two percent for African American appellants as
compared to fifty-three percent for white appel-
lants.10 8 Further, the racial differences in allowance
rates varied across regions with the New York and
Chicago regions showing the largest racial differ-
ences. 0 9 The GAO concluded that the largely
unexplained disparities in allowance rates at the
ALJ level "calls into question the equity of treat-
ment between black and white appellants."110 The
Commissioner of Social Security acknowledged that
the GAO study "suggest[ed] the possibility that ra-
cial bias could be a factor in explaining why, in
aggregate, a higher percentage of blacks are turned
down for benefits than whites at this point in the
adjudication process. '
In response to the GAO Report, SSA made a
number of commitments, one of which was to in-
vestigate the matter and issue a report by June of
1992. However, in response to a 1996 Freedom of
Information Act request for a copy of the report of
that investigation, SSA responded during 1997 that
the report was not completed, and the matter had
been assigned to its Office of Program and Integrity
Reviews for further investigation.11 2 In response to
a second request made during 1999, SSA responded
that while it had indicated that a report would be
prepared on this subject, "no report was ever com-
pleted and there are not plans to complete such a
report at this time."1 3 This failure to complete a
report, however, does not mean that SSA did not
take any actions to address the GAO Report.
During October of 1992, SSA instituted proce-
dures for filing and investigation, if deemed necessary,
of complaints of bias or misconduct against an
ALJ.1 14 Under the complaint procedure, the Regional
Chief ALJ, who conducts an initial inquiry to deter-
mine if the matter merits an investigation, initially
reviews complaints. If an investigation is warranted,
the Office of Hearings and Appeals Special Counsel
conducts it. If that investigation supports a finding
of bias, the Associate Commissioner for Hearings
and Appeals determines, with consultation with the
Chief ALJ, the necessary, appropriate administrative
action. s In addition, SSA undertook the following
administrative procedures in response to the recom-
mendations in the GAO report: (1) review of the
regions with the largest racial differences; (2) design
of a quality assurance system to review a sample of
ALJ decisions; (3) review of the individual judges
with the largest racial difference; (4) development of
a training program for ALJs to recognize bias in de-
cision making; (5) redesign of the management
information systems; (6) "look into" the issues of
racial differences in allowance rates of young Supple-
mental Security Income applicants; and (7) review
of SSA's medical listings to insure no inherent racial
bias in the criteria used to adjudicate impairments
that occur more frequently in blacks.1 1 6 Yet, despite
this straightforward commitment by SSA to address
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the concerns of even the perception of bias among
its ALJs, further investigation discloses that the prob-
lem has been considerably more complicated than
the procedures would suggest.
ALJs have opposed critiques of the "quality or
nature of their decisions," on the grounds that such
processes could become political weapons, interfering
with their decisional independence. u7 Further, Elaine
Golin has pointed out other weaknesses in SSA's pro-
gram. While the procedures provide the ALJ with an
opportunity to respond to the complaint, the complain-
ant is not given the opportunity to respond to the ALJ's
testimony. The current procedure is tailored to ad-
dress individual complaints, but does not address
pattern or practice allegations of discrimination. These
types of allegations have been the subject of class-ac-
tion litigation. Filtering complaints through fellow ALJs
renders the process vulnerable to criticism that ALJs
will be distinctly unfavorably disposed towards com-
plaints about their fellows."' Thus, it does not appear
that SSA is in a position to address concerns raised
about ALJ biased decision making.
Conclusion: Finding Transforming
Opportunities in the Social Security "Crisis"
African Americans and those interested in ensuring
that Social Security does not disadvantage African
Americans should consider this latest Social Secu-
rity "crisis" as an opportunity to transform Social
Security."9 For transformation to occur, reform dis-
cussions must identify and address racial inequities
within the structure and administration of the So-
cial Security program. Otherwise, the interests of
African Americans will be sacrificed for political
expediencies. While some commentary has suggested
that African American interests may be advanced
through litigation in the courts, 120 the real battle-
ground for transforming Social Security is within the
political debate that surrounds Social Security re-
form.121 During this discussion, I have deliberately
avoided assuming a privatization or anti-priva-
tization position. The goal here is to provide the
opportunity and to encourage both camps to reas-
sess and reframe their positions.
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